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Abstract. The Digital Twin refers to a digital representation of any
real-world counterpart allowing its management (from simple monitor-
ing to autonomy). At the core of the concept lies the inclusion of the
entire asset lifecycle. To enable all lifecycle parties to partake, the Digital
Twin should provide a sharable data base. Thereby, integrity and confi-
dentiality issues are pressing, turning security into a major requirement.
However, given that the Digital Twin paradigm is still at an early stage,
most works do not consider security yet. Distributed ledgers provide a
novel technology for multi-party data sharing that emphasizes security
features such as integrity. For this reason, we examine the applicability
of distributed ledgers to secure Digital Twin data sharing. We contribute
to current literature by identifying requirements for Digital Twin data
sharing in order to overcome current infrastructural challenges. We fur-
thermore propose a framework for secure Digital Twin data sharing based
on Distributed Ledger Technology. A conclusive use case demonstrates
requirements fulfillment and is followed by a critical discussion proposing
avenues for future work.
Keywords: trust frameworks · distributed systems security · distributed
ledger technology · digital twin.
1 Introduction
Hardly anything has revolutionized society as much as digitization. At its begin-
ning, data from everyday life was captured and stored digitally. After reaching
significant amounts of digital data, recent years have been devoted to gaining
relevant insights into data by leveraging Big Data Analytics, Artificial Intelli-
gence and so on. A next step in digitization is now emerging in the form of the
Digital Twin (DT) paradigm.
The Digital Twin refers to a digital representation of any real-world counter-
part, at most times an enterprise asset. Its core building blocks are asset-specific
data items, often enhanced with semantic technologies and analysis/simulation
environments to explore the real-world asset digitally. The DT thus allows man-
agement of such an asset ranging from simple monitoring to autonomy. An essen-
tial part of the concept is the inclusion of the whole asset lifecycle. To integrate
all lifecycle participants, the DT should provide comprehensive networking for
its data, allowing it to be shared and exchanged [4].
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Although the DT concept certainly advances digitization, it nevertheless
poses new challenges in terms of IT security, especially in industrial ecosys-
tems [10,18]. Most notably, security must be maintained during the exchange of
DT data between different, non-trusting parties. For instance, consider the DT
of a power plant. Synchronizing tasks between twins should uphold integrity to
avoid manipulated operations on the power plant. Also, involved parties should
not be able to read every shared data element (e.g. the manufacturer of the
power plant need not know the plant’s current status), resulting in confidential-
ity requirements. To the best of our knowledge, current DT frameworks do not
permit secure data sharing. Bridging this gap, our work provides a framework
introducing security-by-design in DT data sharing.
To achieve this goal, we consider Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT). DLT
is the umbrella term for distributed transaction-based systems, shared among
several independent parties in a network. Distributed Ledgers have built-in mech-
anisms for access control and asset management, including authentication and
authorization mechanisms. We focus on permissioned distributed ledgers, which
target enterprise usage by restricting access to fixed set of independent and semi-
trusted participants. One of the main reasons for using a Distributed Ledger is
disintermediation, replacing the need for trust in a third party or central op-
erator through a replicated and integrity-preserving database. Inherent trans-
parency and auditability are additional advantages over centralized solutions.
Due to these properties, DLT is uniquely suited to solve the challenges of DT
secure data sharing.
Accordingly, this work proposes a framework for secure DT data sharing
across an asset’s lifecycle and collaborating parties based on DLT. We contribute
to the body of knowledge by offering a solution without a trusted third party
(TTP) based on security-by-design. The remainder of this paper is organized
as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the background of our work. Afterwards, we
proceed to the description of the current problems in DT data sharing and name
the resulting requirements for secure DT data sharing (Chapter 3). In Chapter
4, we provide a framework for secure DT data sharing for multiple parties based
on DLT. To show practical relevance and the functionality of our framework, a
use case is provided in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, we evaluate our approach in
terms of fulfillment of the stated requirements. To conclude, Chapter 7 sums up
the main contributions and gives an outlook for future work.
2 Background
At present, the Digital Twin phenomenon is still in its infancy. Nevertheless,
implementation and design of this concept are addressed to date, especially in
the area of Industry 4.0. With strong focus on the industrial domain, the major
part of research suggests DT implementation through AutomationML-formatted
descriptive data of the real-world counterpart, e.g. [20,2,6]. The XML-based
AutomationML (AML) format describes industrial assets and provides object-
orientation for modeling the asset’s physical and logical components [20]. Eck-
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hart and Ekelhart [6] propose a framework for using a DT’s simulation mode
for security purposes such as pen testing. While these works focus on an initial
development of a DT, the consideration of data sharing functions are still miss-
ing. However, exchanging data is vital for enabling the lifecycle integration and
collaboration [4]. Our work builds on existing DT propositions, resulting in a
concept that can be applied in a complementary way to enable secure DT data
sharing.
Regarding DT data sharing, both the communication between lifecycle par-
ties and the bidirectional communication between the DT and its real-world
asset counterpart need to be considered. Bidirectional communication consists
of the DT’s instructions for the asset and the asset’s status update for the DT.
To uphold integrity among multi-domain DT models, Talkhestani et al. [21]
offer a solution. They detect model changes by applying anchor points, and
upon detection synchronize the DT while keeping model dependencies consis-
tent. However, this includes drawbacks such as the manual creation of anchor
points and reliance on a Product Lifecycle Management (PLM) system, while
our solution offers platform-independence. Security aspects, such as the guaran-
tee for all lifecycle partners to access the data while upholding confidentiality,
are not considered to date, but integrated in our solution.
DT management is a form of enterprise asset management, which is one of the
prime use cases of Distributed Ledgers [1]. Distributed Ledgers are able to track
events and provenance information along an asset’s lifecycle and increase trans-
parency for all participants. For example, Litke et al. [12] studied the benefits
of Distributed Ledgers for different actors in supply chain asset management, a
research area closely related to DT asset management. In another study, Meroni
and Plebani [14] investigate how the blockchain technology can be used for pro-
cess coordination among smart objects. Smart objects are similar to DTs in that
they are applied for monitoring physical artifacts. An issue with their proposed
approach is that sensor data is also stored on the blockchain, which can be
detrimental to performance and scalability. We consider this issue and provide
a solution to overcome this obstacle.
3 Problem statement
On the one hand, DTs should facilitate the access to asset information for dif-
ferent stakeholders along its lifecycle [17]. It is a task which enables feedback
loops, while stepping towards a circular economy [3]. On the other hand, the
involved parties do not necessarily trust each other, resulting in a confidential-
ity dilemma. A useful example is given in [13]: Two separate standalone DTs
exist for a single device instance, one for the manufacturer and the other at the
customer site – due to information security reasons. Additionally, current works
state that enterprise infrastructures need to overcome the following obstacles to
provide secure DT data sharing:
– application of different tools [24,13]
– usage of various data formats [13]
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– missing standards [4]
– broken information flow across lifecycle phases [24,13]
– clarification of the ownership of information [13]
This calls for a holistic approach that provides confidentiality and integrity, two
central security dimensions in networks [26].
3.1 Digital Twin Model
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Fig. 1. Overview of the asset lifecycle participants interacting with the DT.
Figure 1 illustrates DT data sharing and an exemplary set of lifecycle stake-
holders. The depicted DT model comprises different capabilities and two types
of asset-specific data. Descriptive data refers to static properties of the device
and infrequently changing state information. This data is mainly produced by
users. Sensor data occurs frequently and should be available in near real-time.
It is generated by sensors of the physical asset or in its proximity, which provide
valuable information on the asset’s environmental conditions. Moreover, data of
both types needs to be synchronized with the physical counterpart. Therefore,
the sync capability compares the state of the DT to its real-world counterpart
and resolves possible discrepancies.
The access control capability provides authentication and authorization mod-
ules to enable data sharing of involved parties without hampering confidentiality.
The monitoring, simulation and analysis capabilities represent advanced opera-
tions of the DT. Depending on the extent of the operations present in a DT, DT
status data can be returned to the participant or the real-world counterpart’s
state can be modified.
The depicted information flows show how information about the physical
device is gathered from and sent to the lifecycle parties. The system flows repre-
sent necessary bidirectional synchronization between the DT and its real-world
counterpart as stated in Section 2. Both flows contribute to making the data
sharing activities of the involved parties traceable. This enables feedback from
the latest stages of the asset lifecycle to the earliest ones [17].
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3.2 A formal basis for secure Digital Twin data sharing
Although a methodological literature analysis to establish requirements is the
state-of-the-art approach, it is currently not sensible to carry out with regard to
our research focus. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that only a small
number of publications exist. In addition, data sharing has not yet been a focus
in DT literature to date. Moreover, security-by-design concepts have not been
considered yet. Therefore, we establish a formally valid basis in order to create
a uniform understanding of DT data sharing. To derive the requirements, the
Fig. 2. Control flows for a single DT.
mechanisms to achieve the central goal of secure DT data sharing have to be
examined in detail. Figure 2 illustrates the formal functions required to achieve
this goal, which are also described hereafter.
DT Data: We see DT data twofold: At first, there is a set of descriptive data
elements Ddesc := {d1, ..., dm} varying from documents to models or analytic
outcomes. Its essential data element is the specification of the DT dspec ∈ Ddesc.
The second set contains environmental, device-produced data, namely sensor
data Dsensor := {d1, ..., dn}, whereby Ddesc rDsensor.
Sharing: A finite set of lifecycle parties N := {n1, ..., nk|k ≥ 2} can share the
respective data elements of Ddesc (write operation) or access the data elements of
Ddesc, Dsensor (read operation). This results in the following necessary functions:
write(ni, dj |dj ∈ Ddesc) and read(ni, dj |dj ∈ Ddesc ∨ dj ∈ Dsensor).
Note that 1 ≤ i ≤ k as well as j
{
1 ≤ j ≤ m if j ∈ Ddesc
1 ≤ j ≤ n if j ∈ Dsensor
.
Security-by-design: Security-by-design infers introducing security mecha-
nisms at the very beginning of a system’s design [22]. In terms of DT data and
sharing security, data integrity and confidentiality mechanisms are of special in-
terest. Confidentiality in terms of securing data from view of non-trusted third
parties can be reached by access control mechanisms [19]:
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authentication:
authenticate(ni)
authorization:
authorize(read(ni, dj))
authorize(write(ni, dj))
Integrity of data can be achieved by auditability and traceability of write
operations. Given Ddesc as the origin set of data, D
′
desc is the set of data after
a data element dj is added to the origin set. The following functions can cover
integrity aspects:
auditability:
audit() : Ddesc → D′desc ⇐⇒ write(ni, dj) ∧
Ddesc 9 D′desc ⇐⇒ ¬write(ni, dj)
traceability:
trace() : Ddesc → D′desc =⇒ Ddesc ◦D′desc
Thereby, auditability guarantees that Ddesc is transformed to D
′
desc in case of
an authorized write operation whereas other operations are not able to transform
the data in any way. Traceability ensures that authorized writes of data elements
and thus, transformations of Ddesc to D
′
desc, are chained up. In conclusion, data
integrity is ensured as the data cannot be manipulated or tampered with in
retrospect.
3.3 Requirements for secure DT data sharing
To provide a sound solution for secure DT data sharing, the following require-
ments were derived from the formal basis and the aforementioned challenges
identified in the literature analysis.
R1. Multi-party sharing. To enable lifecycle inclusion, a vital characteris-
tic of the DT paradigm [4], the multiple stakeholders N involved in the lifecycle
have to be considered. As described in Figure 1, parties can vary from manufac-
turer to maintainer. However, all involved parties are pre-registered and therefore
determinable.
R2. Data variety support. At the heart of the DT lie the relevant digital
artifacts Ddesc, Dsensor, which vary from design and engineering data to oper-
ational data to behavioral descriptions [4]. Thus, different data types and data
formats [13] need to be supported during data sharing. For instance, Schroeder
et al. claim that using the semi-structured AutomationML format to model at-
tributes related to the DT (dspec) is very useful for DT data exchange [20]. In
addition to semi-structured data, structured data (e.g. sensor tuples in Dsensor,
database entries) and unstructured data such as human-readable documents can
be asset-relevant and shared via the DT.
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R3. Data velocity support. Often, DT data is distinguished between de-
scriptive, rather static data, and behavioral, more dynamic data (see Figure 1).
The latter changes with time along the lifecycle of the real-world counterpart
[20]: With each lifecycle stage the asset-related information evolves, resulting in
different versions and a dynamic information structure [17]. Naturally, dynamic
data includes sensor data Dsensor – which mostly refers to the actual state of the
real-world counterpart [8]. While the infrequently changing data Ddesc might not
require high throughput, sensor and dynamic data Dsensor accrues in intervals
ranging from minutes to milliseconds. Therefore, the solution must support high
throughput and low sharing latency for efficient sharing of dynamic data – thus
supporting data velocity.
R4. Data integrity and confidentiality mechanisms. An important re-
quirement is taking into account data security features, especially integrity and
confidentiality. At first, this requirement aims at safeguarding data integrity to
avoid wrong analytic decisions based on manipulated data. It can be ensured by
audit() and trace() mechanisms. The second main security objective is to avoid
confidentiality and trust problems while enabling multi-party participation. This
calls for restricted data access dependent on the party through authenticate()
and authorize() functions, while ideally keeping the effort for user registration
low. Different levels of confidentiality should be possible for different data ele-
ments. For instance, Dsensor might need a lower level of protection than Ddesc, as
the latter might include sensitive corporate information such as blueprints. De-
tailed authorize() functions, providing access-restrictions for each data element,
can cover this aspect.
R5. Read and write operations. To interact with DT data, a DT data
sharing solution must provide read() and write() data operations for the sharing
parties. The allowance of operation modes for the data elements should be chosen
carefully for each party to ensure R4 (cf. Figure 2).
Overall, we do not claim that these requirements are complete. There may be
other requirements of importance, but regard these as essential for the following
reasons. On the one hand, these requirements were found to be mentioned most
often in the reviewed literature, while others were less frequently mentioned
and are therefore considered of lower importance (see Section 6.2 for further
explanation). On the other hand, the stated requirements were also the main
focus in various practitioners reports (e.g. [16,25,9]) and during discussions with
experts.
4 Solution architecture
In order to develop a framework for secure DT data sharing, we first evaluate the
suitability of DLT in Section 4.1. Afterwards, Section 4.2 explains the system
architecture and Section 4.3 explains how the various data types are stored. Sec-
tion 4.4 details the inclusion of the DT capabilities as part of the DLT solution.
Finally, Section 4.5 explains the initial setup procedure for our framework.
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4.1 Technology selection
To develop a solution architecture, we first evaluate different data storage solu-
tions’ properties to select the technology best suited to fulfill the requirements.
A centralized solution could be created in the form of a portal, operated
by a third party or the operator of the twinned device. This requires trust of
the participating parties towards the portal maintainer, as the maintainer could
manipulate data or revoke access to the DT for other parties. A distributed
approach jointly operated by all participants could solve this trust issue. Dis-
tributed Ledgers represent such a distributed solution. They permit verifiable
decentralized execution of business logic via smart contracts, ensuring that rules
and processes agreed upon by the lifecycle participants are followed.
We evaluate the applicability of Distributed Ledgers to our DT data shar-
ing requirements based on the blockchain applicability evaluation framework by
Wu¨st and Gervais [28]. As illustrated in Figure 1, there is a need to store various
types of data as part of the DT state. Multiple parties interact with the twin
during its lifecycle who do not fully trust each other. These writers are usually
known in advance or change infrequently (i.e. the maintenance service provider
changes). These characteristics lead to the choice of a public or private per-
missioned blockchain in the framework [28]. In our case, this choice depends on
whether public auditability is required or not. Since read-only public node access
can be enabled during implementation, we do not prescribe either option here.
We assume that for the majority of use cases the confidentiality requirement will
lead to a private system.
4.2 System architecture
The proposed DLT-based architecture for secure DT data sharing is shown in
Figure 3. Every participant runs three components: a node of a Distributed
Hash Table (DHT), a node of the Distributed Ledger and a client ap-
plication. The DHT and Distributed Ledger make up the shared data storage,
while the client application is responsible for the user interface and backend logic
for retrieving and processing the data stored on the ledger and DHT. For owners
of twinned physical devices, a Device agent manages the physical devices and
coordinates their interactions with the system. As part of operational technol-
ogy, the Device agent functions as a bridge between the cross-organizational asset
management system and the physical devices controlled by a single organization.
Data storage systems based on distributed ledgers have two ways of storing
data: on-chain and off-chain [29]. On-chain storage is restricted to transactions
and the internal state storage of smart contracts. Due to full replication of on-
chain data, items larger than a few kilobytes in size need to be stored in a
different, off-chain location. Using a traditional database would however result
in a single point of failure or reintroduce a trusted party.
For this reason, we resort to a structured DHT for large data items. DHTs
are distributed key-value stores, where all key-value pairs are mapped to one or
more nodes. The DHT entries can be linked to the corresponding on-chain asset
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Fig. 3. DLT-based architecture for DT data sharing.
based on the DHT key hash. By storing the hash on the blockchain, integrity of
the off-chain data can be verified after retrieving it from the DHT. To maintain
confidentiality and availability, data stored on the DHT is encrypted, sharded
and replicated. Correspondingly, an access control mechanism is needed to allow
authorized parties to access the data. The k-rAC scheme illustrates how a DHT
can implement the required functionality [11]. In k-rAC, access control is imple-
mented using access control lists (ACL) stored along with each key-value pair
on the DHT. We propose reusing the Distributed Ledger’s public key identities
for DHT authentication. A symmetric key is used for encryption, which is then
available to authorized parties by encrypting it with their public key. The en-
crypted access keys are distributed with each data item’s ACL. Manipulation of
the ACL is prevented by requiring a quorum of 2k+1 nodes for write operations,
where k is the number of tolerated malicious nodes.
4.3 Data storage
There are two types of descriptive data that need to be stored by the sys-
tem: a machine-readable specification and device-related unstructured data (i.e.
human-readable documents). The specification includes a description of the de-
vice’s hardware components as well as their functions. The DT’s physical prop-
erties are derived from this specification. For our work we assume that AML
is used to describe the physical asset. The AML specification is stored on the
ledger in a modifiable way. This approach guarantees that updates to the device
specification are observed by all parties. Distributed Ledgers can store complex
modifiable state by using smart contracts. We thus refer to the resulting contract
as the specification contract.
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Unstructured data can be uploaded to the system and may subsequently
be annotated or modified by other parties. Due to its size it cannot easily be
parsed and stored in contracts. For this reason, it is stored off-chain and regis-
tered in the smart-contract with a document title and a hash of the contents.
To update a document, a new version must be uploaded to the DHT and the
smart contract reference updated. This ensures that changes to the documents
are traceable.
Sensor data needs to be stored off-chain due to its frequent updates and
the considerable amount of generated data. A history of the sensor data is kept
to allow for further analysis, e.g. predictive maintenance or troubleshooting.
The link to the on-chain data is established via a pointer to the off-chain storage
location, stored on-chain in the specification contract. To avoid having to update
the storage location hash every time new sensor data is uploaded to the DHT, we
take advantage of DHT feeds. This concept is inspired by the Ethereum network’s
DHT Swarm [7]. In Swarm, a feed is defined by a feed manifest with a unique
address on the network. The feed manifest’s owner (i.e. the physical device) is
the only user permitted to upload signed and timestamped data to this address.
Any data format can be used and a history of uploaded data is kept. The DHT
feed enables frequent sensor data sharing without having to update an on-chain
reference. Based on the feed, the client application may compare sensor updates
with expected values derived from the specification contract to detect anomalies.
Additionally, there is no need for directly accessing the physical device, which
may reside in a protected network. Instead, data updates are readily available
on the DHT for authorized participants.
Many organizations also have additional internal data sources or microser-
vices that provide structured data relevant to the Digital Twin. These data
sources can be included in the twin by adding references (i.e. an URI) to the
DT specification contract. This allows inclusion of legacy data sources and com-
plex data which cannot easily be stored on a DHT (i.e. relational data). If the
external data source requires authentication, it is the responsibility of the data
source provider to ensure access rights for the DT ledger’s identities.
Listing 1.1 shows a pseudocode representation of the data types stored in
the specification contract. The syntax is inspired by Ethereum’s Solidity smart
contract programming language. All data stored on the contract is readable
by all lifecycle participants. Besides general device metadata, the contract also
includes a program call queue for interaction with the physical device’s program
interfaces (see also Section 4.4). Since smart contracts must be deterministic
and thus cannot interact with files, the AML specification is stored in a string
variable. This variable can later be parsed and modified, as illustrated in Section
4.4. Hash references to new original documents on the DHT are kept track of
in the documents mapping. The hash serves as an identifier, while the document
struct provides metadata. Updated versions of each document are stored in the
documentVersions mapping. The componentID and corresponding feed reference
of the sensor data stream on the DHT are stored in the sensorFeeds mapping.
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/* metadata and specification*/
string deviceName
string deviceID
string deviceAML
string[] callProgramQueue
/* additional descriptive data */
struct Document {
uint timestamp
string description
address owner
}
struct ExternalSource{
string URI
address owner
}
mapping(string=>Document) documents
mapping(string=>string[]) documentVersions
ExternalSource[] externalSources
/* sensor data */
mapping(string=>string) sensorFeeds
Listing 1.1. Data structures of the
specification contract
/* descriptive data interfaces */
function addDocument(document)
function addDocumentVersion(string hash)
function removeDocument(string hash)
function addExternalSource(string URI)
function removeExternalSource(string URI)
/* sensor data interfaces */
function addSensorFeed(string componentID,
string reference)
function removeSensorFeed(string componentID)
/* interaction with the specification */
function insertAML(string amlCode, string
parentID, string afterID)
function removeAML(string ID)
function callProgram(string programName,
string parameters[])
Listing 1.2. Function interfaces of the
specification contract
4.4 Capabilities
We focus on the three capabilities required for accessing and publishing DT data:
DT interaction, access control and sync.
DT interaction refers to the information flows in Figure 1, which allow users
to interact with the twin’s data. The specification contract implements this func-
tionality. It allows users to read and potentially modify the DT instance. The
relevant interfaces that can be called with transactions are shown in Listing 1.2.
New or updated references to documents may be appended by any authorized
user. The same applies to external data sources and sensor feed references to the
DHT. The specification can be manipulated by inserting or removing specific
AML segments, which are identified by their ID. To determine the position of
a new AML code segment in the AML document, the parent ID and the ID
of the preceding element need to be passed as parameters. The twin’s program
interfaces for setting device parameters can be accessed via callProgram. This
function checks authorization, finds the requested program in the AML specifi-
cation and places it in a queue for the Device agent to retrieve. The agent then
forwards the program call to the device for execution.
The access control capability is responsible for authentication and autho-
rization of user interactions with the DT data. For user authentication, accounts
are created on the blockchain and represented by their public key. An initial
solution could be provided by the framework’s built-in identity management,
for example Hyperledger Fabric’s Membership Service Provider (MSP) [1]. The
MSP lists the certificate authorities who may issue digital identities for the Dis-
tributed Ledger. The same identity can then be reused for authentication in
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the DHT. Authorization is realized in a separate access control smart contract.
Any protected interaction with the Digital Twin is first authorized through that
contract. Such interactions are for example modifications of the twin’s proper-
ties, like changing parameters or modifying its specification. A query from the
client application provides an identity to the specification contract, which then
interacts with the authorization contract to determine if the user is allowed to
perform the action. Authorization is then granted or denied based upon a stored
role-permission mapping. Accordingly, the contract’s interfaces are based upon a
Role-based Access Control (RBAC) scheme. We do not describe the access con-
trol contract in detail here, as there are other works describing blockchain-based
access control schemes [5].
The sync capability requires regular interaction between the Device agent and
the Distributed Ledger. For synchronization, the Device agent pulls updates from
the real-world asset and uploads them to the off-chain DHT sensor data feed.
The Device agent monitors the ledger and pushes any modifications instructed
by committed on-chain transactions to the asset. The synchronization interval
depends on the use case.
Other DT capabilities like monitoring, simulation and analysis can be exe-
cuted off-chain by interacting with the local copy of the ledger. Simulation or
analysis instructions and results can be shared on the ledger as documents. This
would allow other parties to verify the results, should they desire to do so.
4.5 Setup Process
Initially, each lifecycle participant sets up one network node running both a DHT
and a Distributed Ledger node. These serve as local replicas of ledger data and
access points for off-chain data. They may also be used for transaction-based
interaction with the smart contracts. Additionally, an identity provider must be
set up to allow federated identities from all participating organizations based on
public key certificates.
Once the network is set up, a Digital Twin instance can be created on the
ledger by the device owner. The manufacturer should first provide the AML file
to the owner, who then proceeds to set up a Digital Twin sharing instance on
the ledger. The client application provides the interface to upload the file and
create a smart contract based on it. Before uploading, the owner also needs to
specify the access rights associated with the various parts of the specification.
Although use case dependent, sensible default values could be write access by
owner and maintainer and read access by everyone else.
In this way, any number of Digital Twin instances can be created by the
various parties on the network. Each instance is represented by a specification
contract. Subsequent modifications take place via authorized on-chain transac-
tions and are stored as part of the contract’s internal state. As a result, auditing
the twin is possible by (actively or retroactively) monitoring smart contract
transactions for anomalies.
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5 Use Case
This chapter intends to show how the theoretical framework developed in Chap-
ter 4 is traversed in a use case. To begin with, the overall setting of the use case
is described in Section 5.1, while the subsequent Section 5.2 iterates the use case
through the solution architecture. At last, a summary is given, focusing on the
automation degree in data sharing and the reading operation (Section 5.3).
5.1 Setting
The setting is chosen close to reality. The asset, the real-world counterpart to
the DT, is a bottling plant, where bottles are filled with beverages. The parties
involved in the asset lifecycle are a manufacturer, an owner, a maintainer of the
bottling plant and an external auditor that audits the safety of our bottling plant.
For our use case, we consider the following scenario: The bottles are flooding due
to a broken sensor in the bottling plant. Consequently, the maintainer detects
the damage and changes the broken sensor in the bottling plant.
This entails the following shared data interactions. At first, the specification
of the plant needs to be updated by replacing the broken sensor’s specification
entry with the newly added sensor. Additionally, the new sensor’s data stream
has to be integrated in place of the old sensor stream. Other documents concern-
ing the maintenance task might also be shared, such as a maintenance report.
While the maintainer is the only party sharing data in this scenario, the
owner should also be updated on the state of the bottling plant. Furthermore,
the manufacturer needs to be informed that the sensor is broken, so that an
analysis of the time and circumstances can be conducted. This way relevant
insights for future plant manufacturing can be gained. Additionally, the external
auditor needs to access the information about the maintenance task to review
the procedure in terms of safety compliance.
5.2 Framework iteration
This use case triggers a specific logical order of events in the framework, which
are highlighted in Figure 4 and described hereafter. The framework first comes
into play when the maintainer replaces the broken sensor.
1. All devices are connected with the Device agent, which registers the ex-
change of the broken sensor. Additionally, it gathers information about the
new sensor.
2. Following the new sensor connection, the Device agent forwards the new
incoming data stream of the sensor into the DHT. The location of the stored
sensor stream in the DHT is registered by the Device agent.
The Device agent then sends a transaction containing the new sensor spec-
ification to the Distributed Ledger. This transaction invokes the specifi-
cation contract, resulting in several updates. First, the old sensor entry is
removed and the new sensor specification given by the Device agent is
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Fig. 4. Use case tailored architecture for DT data sharing.
added. Secondly, the storage location of the sensor stream on the DHT is
added by a reference to the location. These three transactions concerning
the specification are stored on the Distributed Ledger.
3. Having performed the maintenance task, the maintainer writes a mainte-
nance report and pushes it onto the Client application.
4. The Client application adds the maintenance report by performing two
actions. Firstly, it adds the report to the off-chain DHT. Secondly, it stores
the reference to the DHT location of the report on the specification contract.
Thereby, the location is added to the entry of the sensor specification.
5.3 Results
In a nutshell, the recognition of new sensor and the AML update with the new
component is already accomplished by the Device agent without requiring hu-
man interaction. The new data stream is automatically forwarded to the DHT
and the reference to the new storage location of the component’s data stream
is added to the specification contract. Additional unstructured non-specification
data (e.g. the maintenance report) can be added manually. The Client appli-
cation takes care of the necessary background work by inserting the file into the
DHT and adding the respective storage reference into the specification contract.
All participating parties can view the latest transactions on the ledger –
presented in a comprehensive way in the Client application. Advanced Client
applications could also notify the user whenever an ledger update takes place.
Considering security, the advantages of this framework shine when compared
to the alternative solution: A TTP could deliberately transfer shared informa-
tion and know-how to rival enterprises. For instance, confidential sensor data
or blueprints could be leaked to competitors, which may then deduce quality
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issues of the rival product. The service of the TTP could also be compromised
by attackers, resulting e.g. in a violation of integrity so that the sharing parties
receive inconsistent asset versions.
6 Evaluation
To evaluate our framework, Section 6.1 discusses the suitability of the framework
in reference to the requirements. Finally, the results are discussed in Section 6.2.
6.1 Requirements fulfillment
To sum up, our approach fulfills the requirements R1-R5. The following para-
graphs explain how each requirement was addressed in our solution architecture.
R1. Multi-party sharing. The main argument for using Distributed Ledgers
is the involvement of multiple parties N who produce and consume data. Next to
the ledger, our approach provides a client application for all parties that accesses
the data on the ledger and the DHT. Therefore, our approach clearly fulfills R1.
R2. Data variety support. To enable the sharing of different data in
various formats, our approach provides a central documentation and two storage
options. The standardized asset description dspec is included in the Distributed
Ledger and serves as the basis of the DT within the specification contract. All
other data of Ddesc as well as the sensor data Dsensor are stored off-chain in the
DHT. Moreover, each stored data element in DHT is registered in the central
specification contract as a reference to the storage location of the data element.
For instance, a sensor in the specification contract contains a reference to the
storage position of its data stream in the DHT. Hence, R2 is met.
R3. Data velocity support. Modern sensor data streams’ frequency and
volume exceed the performance characteristics of current Distributed Ledger
frameworks. Since the data streams Dsensor do not describe main features of the
DT (dspec), they are stored off-chain in the DHT. This way, high throughput of
Dsensor is supported, while the sharing latency is also kept low (seconds). The
Distributed Ledger maintains verifiability by storing the hash reference to the
data stream on the DHT in the specification contract. This ensures no loss in
performance and data access through the DHT, supporting R3.
R4. Data integrity and confidentiality mechanisms. With respect to
data integrity, the Distributed Ledger attaches every new data element (trace())
and prevents manipulation of the data by replicating it among all involved par-
ties. A manipulation would result in a version mismatch or loss of consensus and
could be detected easily (audit()). The second storage component (DHT) also
supports integrity by storing the respective hash values to the data. A manipu-
lation of DHT data would also be detected by a mismatch between the hashes
in the nodes (audit()). However, there remains the problem of adding non-valid
data, which is a common issue in the area of DLT. Here, we rely on the parties’
interest in sharing valid data and on mechanisms ensuring quality of input data
that the respective responsible party applies.
16 M.Dietz et al.
In terms of data confidentiality, our approach ensures that the data is read
only by authenticated and authorized parties. Authentication is ensured through
lifecycle party login to the client application (authenticate()). Access control
concerning the party and the data elements is realized through an ACL and
encryption for off-chain data and an authorization smart contract for on-chain
data (authorize()). In concrete terms, the ACLs specify access rights on a per-
document basis, while the smart contract stores authorization information for
all involved parties. Therefore, different confidentiality levels can be realized.
To conclude, our approach provides data integrity and confidentiality mech-
anisms (R4) – reinforcing data security in DT data sharing.
R5. Read and write operations. Read and write operations are managed
through the Client application. For read() operations, the Client application
fetches the requested data from the DHT and the ledger and presents the data
in a comprehensive way adjusted for the demanding party. In case of a write()
operation, the Client application triggers the right procedure to alter the smart
contract with a transaction and uploads additional asset-relevant data beyond
specification to the DHT. Consequently, our approach also fulfills R5.
6.2 Discussion
Keeping the requirements variety (R2) and velocity (R3) in mind, the question
arises why data volume is not considered a requirement. As literature is currently
not at consensus regarding the relevance of the Big Data feature volume [15] for
Digital Twins, we consider explicit support for data volume to be non-necessary.
Nevertheless, our approach can deal with a fair amount of data.
It should be noted that our approach depends on multi-party participation.
The more independent parties maintain the Distributed Ledger and DHT, the
less vulnerable the data sharing is to manipulation. With regard to the access
control capability, a decentralized identity management solution with a shared
identity database could be an even more holistic, next-generation solution.
While we are aware that our approach currently lacks an implementation,
we nevertheless believe that the use case shows suitability for practice. Future
work will focus on implementing the framework. Here, challenges might include
adjusting a DHT framework to support authorization and data feeds (although
Swarm shows promise in this regard [7]), as well as selecting a suitable Dis-
tributed Ledger framework.
The Distributed Ledger and the concomitant smart contracts could also be
handled in a different way. For instance, the AML could be transformed into
classes and types in the smart contract, similar to the BPMN to Solidity trans-
formation in [27]. However, the effort clearly outweighs the utility as AML is
a very powerful standard allowing very complex descriptions. Moreover, not all
of the hypothetically generated classes and functions might be needed. Plus,
functions or classes might be newly added later on, which results in the need to
re-create the smart contract as they are currently not represented in the smart
contract. This clearly increases effort and downgrades utility.
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Another issue is entailed by the possibility to directly alter variable values
referring to an actual function in our current version of the ledger. For instance,
consider a PLC device with various functions such as setting a conveyor belt’s
velocity (with an integer parameter). Without constraints, the changed velocity
could exceed safety bounds. Safety threats like this one, be they malicious or
accidental, need to be mitigated in a production system. Therefore, we suggest
integrating safety and security rules as proposed in [6]. They could be integrated
as part of the specification contract, with the Device agent checking conformance
of program calls on synchronization.
With respect to the current problems hampering secure DT data sharing,
our approach tackles the issues stated in Chapter 3 in the following ways:
– The usage of different tools that can be connected with our main data sharing
approach is possible (application of different tools)
– Our approach is tailored for the integration of data in multiple formats and
variety (usage of various data formats)
– An agreement only on the standard describing the asset (e.g. AML) is re-
quired to transform the main description of the asset into a smart contract,
while other standardized or non-standardized data can still be shared (miss-
ing standards)
– The proposed shared collaborative data basis is distributed among all in-
volved parties and the information flow is universal across the lifecycle phases
(broken information flow across lifecycle phases)
– The Distributed Ledger registers the data and the involved party sharing the
data, while mechanisms such as access control support confidentiality issues
(clarification of the ownership of information)
To sum up, the major part of the identified issues in the literature referring to
DT data sharing are diminished or solved by our approach.
7 Conclusion
DT data not only ties physical and virtual twin [23], it also enables integration
of the whole asset lifecycle, which is essential for realizing the DT paradigm.
Moreover, the exchange of asset-relevant data (DT data) is vital for achieving
the effects of a feedback loop. Closing the feedback loop in turn favors the de-
velopment of a circular economy.
However, maintaining data security becomes a major requirement when shar-
ing DT data between multiple parties, especially as the parties do not necessarily
trust each other. Our approach of applying DLT can clearly solve this issue and
enable secure multi-party data sharing. It provides confidentiality through ac-
cess control arranged by usage of a smart contract. Moreover, data integrity is
implicitly supported through the immutability of the original data in the ledger.
To conclude, our approach fulfills the requirements R1-R5 for secure DT
data sharing. Nevertheless, there remain minor drawbacks that need to be ad-
dressed in future research (see Section 6.2). Our upcoming work will focus on
implementing our theoretical concept to demonstrate its feasibility in practice.
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